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I. INTRODUCTION
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you
need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in
every battle.1
You might ask what an ancient text, written by a Chinese
philosopher over 2,500 years ago, could possibly have to do with
the topic of my essay, which concerns the rights of Native
American artists to their creative works and the rights of tribal
governments to protect tribal cultural art forms, such as quill work,
bead work, and basketry. Indigenous artists and tribal communities
are actively engaged in a fight to protect their cultures and art
forms from appropriation and misuse. As Walter Echo-Hawk
observes, there has been little legal protection for the cultural
rights of Indigenous peoples, and consequently, “indigenous
heritage has been appropriated, pirated and misused.”2 According
to Echo-Hawk:
The theft of culture is part of the one-way transfer
of property from indigenous to non-indigenous
hands seen in colonies and settler states around the
world—it includes not only the taking of land,
natural resources, personal property, but even the
heritage of indigenous peoples and their very
identities, plucking them as clean as a Safeway
chicken.3
Of course, many non-Indians fail to appreciate that Indigenous
peoples hold a form of property right to aspects of their cultures,
1

SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 18 (James Clavell ed. 1983).
WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NATIVE AMERICA AND THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 198 (2013).
3
Id.
2
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namely the right to exclude others from particular uses or condition
such use by requiring a license (for example, for the commercial
use of the tribal name).4 The U.S. laws regulating intellectual
property rights (copyright, patent, trademark) provide a poor fit for
the interests of Indigenous nations in protecting the intangible
aspects of their cultural heritage.5 There have been limited
victories by federally recognized American Indian and Alaska
Native nations seeking to prevent consumer confusion about what
an “Indian product” is for purposes of the federal Indian Arts and
Crafts Act,6 which protects the right of American Indian and
Alaska Native artists to market their art as an authentic Indian
product.7 However, the appropriation of tribal art forms continues,
as design guru Ralph Lauren and commercial marketers such as
J.C. Penney have demonstrated by transforming the intricate silver
and turquoise jewelry of Southwest Indian tribes into mass-market
products for trendy fashionistas trying to “play Indian.”8 If
appropriately labeled to avoid consumer confusion, the non-Indian
design world will continue to capture the greatest share of
commercial value of tribal art forms, and most consumers and
producers will overlook the impact on tribal cultural identity.
Many, if not most, non-Indians fail to understand the
significance of cultural identity to Indigenous peoples, nor do they

4

Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of
Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (2005) (describing
the use of Native American cultural practices in the entertainment industry
without any social response to the appropriation of Native American culture.)
5
Id.
6
See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662.
7
See id.
8
See John Hartman, Under Turquoise Skies – Ralph Lauren, DURANGO SILVER
(Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.durangosilver.com/blog/tag/ralph-lauren-turquoise/;
See Megan Finnerty, Stepping into a Cultural Conundrum, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC,
Apr.
25,
2015,
http://www.azcentral.com/story/entertainment/arts/2015/04/25/appropriationcultural-conundrum-native-american/26334281/
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understand the concept of cultural harm.9 Consequently, the battle
over cultural appropriation continues as Dan Snyder, owner of the
Washington team, proclaims that the “Redskins” logo and team
name actually honors Indians, ignoring the protests of Native
leaders and tribal members who assert that the mascot disparages
and degrades them.10 The battle continues over sacred symbols as
pop music giant Pharrell Williams and countless other celebrities
wear garish “war bonnets”11 in a caricature of the ceremonial
headdress that is culturally authorized for use only by esteemed
and worthy tribal leaders from the Indigenous nations of the
Southern and Northern Plains. But is this really a desecration or is
it a permissible act of artistic appropriation? If there is no legal
right to stop these appropriations, why should it matter? Perhaps
most vexing of all, it seems to outsiders that not “all Indians” agree
on the terms of the debate. Team owner Dan Snyder pointed this
out as he hosted his VIP guests, then-Navajo Nation President Ben
Shelly and First Lady Martha Shelly, during a 2014 football game
in Glendale, Arizona, all wearing hats with the infamous
Washington Team logo.12

9

See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American
Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
396, 405–09 (2007) (articulating multiple examples of cultural harm against
Indians by non-Indians due to their failure to recognize or understand the
significance of cultural identity and the unique nature of Tribal claims).
10
Daniel Snyder Defends Redskins, ESPN (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11313245/daniel-snyder-redskins-term-honorrespect. This essay refers to that entity as “the Washington Team” in the text
that follows.
11
See ELLE (July 2014) (UK edition) (picturing Williams on the cover in a
headdress); Shan Li, Victoria’s Secret Apologizes For Use of Native American
Headdress,
LA
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/13/business/la-fi-victorias-secret-nativeamerican-20121113.
12
See Andrew Joseph, Navajo Nation President Ben Shelly Sits in Box With Dan
Snyder,
ARIZ.
CENT.
(Oct.
13,
2014,
10:39
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/sports/heat-index/2014/10/13/navajo-nationpresident-ben-shelly-sits-in-box-with-dan-snyder/17188935/.
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If one reads Sun Tzu’s words carefully, it is abundantly clear
that identity is of paramount importance in times of war, as in the
context of a battle.13 One must know oneself and also one’s enemy.
Similarly, one must differentiate the rules of governance that hold
a civil society together, from the principles that govern a war
between enemies. Sun Tzu also wrote that “[h]umanity and justice
are the principles” by which states must govern their affairs.14 In
comparison, “opportunism and flexibility” govern armies as they
go to war with the enemy, and these are “military rather than civic
virtues.”15 Are we in a time where just principles of governance
will define the respective boundaries between Native rights and
those who want to profit from Native culture? Or do the terms of
the debate suggest that cultural production is yet another
battleground between Native governments and the nation-states
that now encompass them?
This essay is intended to facilitate a dialogue about who
possesses the authority to use tribal designs, symbols and motifs
within the contemporary sphere of cultural production.16 I will
explore why U.S. copyright and trademark law often do not
adequately protect the interests of Native artists or tribal
governments, and why tribal governments should be concerned
about the international dialogue concerning ownership of
traditional cultural expression. This essay builds on Walter EchoHawk’s argument that securing adequate legal protection for the
cultural rights of Native artists and tribal governments is pivotal to
the realization of their human rights within domestic society.17
Echo-Hawk’s argument embodies a complex array of issues, and
this essay maps those issues for future discussion and analysis. In
my view, Echo-Hawk appropriately describes the protection of
Indigenous cultural rights as the most important issue for the future
13

See TZU, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Id. at 17.
15
Id.
16
Finnerty, supra note 8.
17
ECHO-HAWK, supra note 2 at 198.
14
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because if the law cannot intervene to protect Indigenous peoples
from cultural harm, the final phase of colonialism will proceed
unabated. I use the term “colonialism” to describe the power
dynamics of European settlement on the lands that ultimately
became the United States.18 That dynamic alternately engaged
policies of war and peace with Native peoples, but always
employed the use of power and dominance to subordinate Native
peoples and appropriate land, resources, and rights from them. This
was done to build the empire of the British Crown and then to
build the new nation that emerged as the United States.
Colonialism in the United States has proceeded through three
phases. The first phase involved the destruction of Native peoples
through outright military action from the date of European contact
until the “Indian Wars” were deemed officially concluded in the
United States at the close of the nineteenth century.19 The
battleground was tangible and the cost of defeat was loss of life.
There was no confusion over who was Indigenous and who was
not. The conversation was about who was an ally and who was an
enemy. During this first phase, the United States used its military
power to subdue Indigenous Nations who were deemed to be the
enemies of the United States, and the U.S. sought political
alliances with Indigenous Nations who were willing to be its
allies.20 There are over 500 treaties between American Indian
Nations and the United States government, dating from 1778 until
1871, when Congress ended making treaties with Indian nations.21
Each of those documents acknowledges the sovereignty of the
18

See CAROLE GOLDBERG, REBECCA TSOSIE, KEVIN WASHBURN & ELIZABETH
WASHBURN, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 3 (6th ed. 2010) (describing Federal Indian law as “a doctrinal,
historical vestige of the legal regime that tried to rationalize, legitimate, and
regulate American colonialism over Indian tribes.”).
19
See id., at 1–121 (recounting the history of Federal Indian law in great detail).
20
Id. at 14–20.
21
Id. at 4; Helen Oliff, Treaties Made, Treaties Broken, NAT’L RELIEF
CHARITIES BLOG (March 3, 2011), http://blog.nrcprograms.org/treaties-madetreaties-broken/.
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Indian nations, as well as their rightful claims to their traditional
lands and resources. Most of those treaties were subsequently
breached,22 in whole or in part, due to the actions of the United
States, as well as its failure to protect treaty-guaranteed lands from
encroachment by settlers.23 Today, that brutal past exists in
monuments that mark the sites of the massacres at Wounded Knee,
Sand Creek, and other places where Native peoples experienced
genocide as they fought to protect their homelands and peoples. Of
course, the past also lives on in the memory of their descendants.
The second phase of colonialism involved the appropriation of
Native lands and cultural objects for use of Euro-American settlers
in the guise of efforts to civilize Indians so that they could
eventually be incorporated into society as American citizens.
During this era, all Indians were treated alike, whether they had
been friends or enemies of the United States during the prior
interval. Federal civilization policy relied on the notion of a
“wardship” under which the benevolent civilized government
maintained virtually absolute control over the “savage” wards, who
were deemed to lack the fundamental capacity to maintain rights to
ownership of property or ability to contract for goods and services,
as “civilized” peoples could. Until the late 1930s, the Indian Agent
assigned to each reservation assumed direct control over tribal
members on the reservation, and the Indian ward had no right to
leave the reservation or enter the larger society, except with the
approval of the Agent or his designees. The battleground became
both tangible and intangible because control was exercised over
the physical body and at the level of the mind to break down the
freedom of Native peoples and their ability to maintain their
historical and separate cultural and political identities. Federal law
and policy converted the political relationship between Nations

22
23

Oliff, supra note 21.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18 at 15–16.
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into a hierarchical relationship between the dependent ward and
the benevolent master as “trustee.”24
During this second era of colonialism, the United States
government used its political power to appropriate vast amounts of
Native land and tangible tribal cultural heritage, including sacred
objects, objects of cultural patrimony, and human remains.25 At the
same time, the U.S. government endeavored to erase tribal cultural
identity through a mandatory civilization program that featured the
federal boarding school policy; federally-supported efforts to
convert Indians to Christianity; the federal allotment policy, which
was designed to break down tribal landholdings and inculcate an
individual ethic of property ownership, as well as other nineteenth
and twentieth century equivalents. Policymakers touted the
civilization program as being “beneficial” to Indians because it
would prepare them for a future in which they might transcend the
limitations of their status as wards and become U.S. citizens.26
Initially, Congress selectively naturalized American Indians to
citizenship if they demonstrated successful assimilation.27 In 1924,
Congress enacted the Indian Citizenship Act, which extended U.S.
citizenship to all American Indians, but specified that they would
retain their treaty rights and political rights under federal law, as
members of federally recognized tribal governments.28
Indigenous peoples survived the first two waves of colonialism
and today, federally recognized tribal governments exist as
24

Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 299, 317-332 (2002)
(describing the relationship between historical policies and the use of native
images by outsiders.).
25
See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage?
“Art,” “Artifacts,” and the Right to Cultural Survival, CULTURAL HERITAGE
ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE (2009);
see also Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24, at 317-332.
26
See Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24 at 317–332.
27
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 30.
28
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)).
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separate nations, with recognized legal rights of self-governance
and the moral and political right to self-determination.29 Tribal
governments possess executive, legislative, and judicial powers,
and they exercise jurisdiction over their lands and their members.30
American Indian and Alaska Native peoples are members of their
tribal Nations, as well as full citizens of the United States and the
states where they reside. They are free to practice the religion of
their choice, can attend public or private schools, and may reside
on or off the reservation. Some would say that we are no longer in
an era of colonialism because citizenship guarantees the same
autonomy of choice that all members of U.S. civil society possess.
However, I argue that we are currently in a third and perhaps final
phase of colonialism, which is quite insidious because it operates
at the level of consciousness. We all possess beliefs that are deeply
programmed into our subconscious minds and these beliefs inform
our actions and our beliefs about what is “possible.” As collectives
and as individuals, who do we think that “we” are and who do we
think that “they” are? Have “we” become “them”? Do we mirror
who “they” think that “we” are? Clearly, identity matters. But who
decides the rules? And as we address the issue of Indigenous
cultural rights, do we operate by the principles of just governance
in a civil society? Or do we operate by the principles of war?
These are complex questions and they merit sustained
attention. This essay will frame the components of the debate as a
way to expand the dialogue about the rights of Native artists and
the role of Indigenous rights in “cultural production,” which is a
process that involves many different dynamics, including social
media, the entertainment industry, the art industry, the
marketplace, the laws that govern the rights of “individuals” to
their creations (intellectual property law), and the laws that govern
the rights of tribal governments to their cultures (Federal Indian
29

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18 at 13–39, 111–12.
See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 382-94 (discussing tribal
governmental structures and functions in the modern era); 1–18 COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012).
30
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law). In discussing “American” cultural production, I will build on
an insight made by Kevin Gover, Director of the National Museum
of the American Indian, at a recent lecture given at Arizona State
University.31 Gover discussed an upcoming exhibit at the National
Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) entitled “Americans,”
noting that until the 1700s, the term was used exclusively to
reference Indigenous peoples in the Americas. However, over
time, the term “Americans” has become synonymous with the
people of the United States. The United States was birthed from
British colonies and presumably built upon a British cultural
tradition. This is clearly illustrated by our categories of law and
philosophy, which continue to inform the discussion about rights
and what is a legal issue, versus a moral issue. However, the
United States has constructed itself as a multicultural democracy
through a mode of cultural production that draws heavily upon its
“Indigenous” heritage. Does the cultural heritage of Indigenous
peoples belong to the United States? Or is this appropriation of
Indigenous cultural identity the final act of colonialism in a
centuries-long struggle to claim victory over the Indigenous
Nations of this land?
That question is of increasing importance since technology can
enhance our capacity to generate creative expression, but it can
also further confuse cultural identity. This essay highlights the
contemporary policy issues and argues for Indigenous nations to
develop their own governance systems for “traditional cultural
expression,” which is the term used by nation-states to describe a
default category of cultural heritage that contains anything that is
not formally protected under existing intellectual property laws.32
31

Kevin Gover, Dir., Nat’l Museum of the Am. Indian, Lecture at the Sandra
Day O’Connor College of Law Indigenous Stereotypes in Sports Symposium
(Jan. 30, 2015).
32
In 2013, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) sought
comment on a draft Treaty dealing with the Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expression. In that draft, Traditional Cultural Expression is defined as “any
form of artistic and literary expression, tangible and/or intangible, or a
combination thereof, . . . in which traditional culture and knowledge are
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In addition, individual Native artists should be active participants
in the dialogue about the relationship between art and cultural
identity and what falls within the category of permissible cultural
production, as a system of voluntary and appropriate cultural
sharing and exchange. This must be contrasted with what falls
within the category of cultural misappropriation, meaning the
involuntary and exploitive transfer of value and benefit from the
Indigenous group to the dominant producers and consumers of the
global arts economy.33 Currently, public policy is unable to
differentiate the permissible use of Indigenous cultural expression
from its misuse, and Indigenous peoples are the only ones who can
speak to this.34 I will argue that the rules of civil society should
govern this debate in a spirit of just and respectful intercultural
exchange between Indigenous peoples and the various national and
global governance systems. However, if this is not possible, we
should at least understand the rules of the war that we are engaged
in, and we should acknowledge the battlegrounds that exist at the
level of consciousness and in the material world that drives our
economic system.
In the text that follows, I will sketch my ideas in a
chronological form, so that the reader can understand the
relationship of Indigenous cultural identity to the rights of cultural
embodied . . . [and] which is intergenerational, . . . including, but not limited to
phonetic and verbal expressions, musical and sound expressions, expressions by
action, tangible expressions, and adaptations of these expressions.” The notes to
the text clarify that the category encompasses stories, epics, legends, poetry,
narratives, songs, rituals, dance, plays, ceremonies, and games, as well as
“material expressions of art, handicrafts, ceremonial masks or dress, handmade
carpets, architecture and sacred places.” Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft Articles,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/27/5 (Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter “Draft Articles”], available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_27/wipo_grtkf_ic_27_5.
pdf.
33
Finnerty, supra note 8 (distinguishing the two sets of cases).
34
Id.
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production in the modern era. Part II of the paper discusses the
context for the debate by examining the historical and modern
context of cultural imagery, as it has affected Native peoples. Part
III discusses identity harms and the role of tribal governments in
regulating the protection of Native culture under existing domestic
law. Part IV of the paper focuses on the rights of Native artists to
their creations and the principles that U.S. law invokes for
determining rights claims. In Part V, the paper discusses the
broader implications of these issues for Indigenous peoples,
focusing on international human rights law as a tool to define
Indigenous governance over cultural identity.
II. COLONIALISM, CULTURAL IMAGERY,
AND NATIVE PEOPLES
As Professor Robert Williams notes in his brilliant critique of
Western civilization, Savage Anxieties, Western European peoples
have, for centuries, employed the cultural imagery of the “savage”
to divest other peoples (including Indigenous peoples) of their
rights and to reinvent their own governments and societies in the
process.35 Williams argues that “without the idea of the savage to
understand what it is, what is was, and what it could be, Western
civilization, as we know it, would never have been able to invent
itself.”36 In particular, Western philosophers and jurists relied on
the notion of an “irreconcilable difference between civilization and
savagery” to shape and direct the nature of the policies that would
govern their interaction with these peoples.37
Building on his prior work, Williams demonstrates how the
cultural imagery of the “savage” justified the Doctrine of
Discovery, under which Western European nations appropriated
lands in the Americas for their “ownership” and control during the
colonial era; the same cultural imagery was invoked to birth a new
35

ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF WESTERN
CIVILIZATION 1 (2012).
36
Id.
37
Id.
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nation, the United States, and to justify its claims for land
acquisition during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.38
Today, Williams claims, this dynamic reprises in stereotypes of
Native peoples and legal justifications for policies that would
otherwise reflect an illegitimate form of racism under
contemporary law.39 Native stereotypes continue while the overt
caricatures of Black, Latino, and Asian peoples have disappeared
from the contemporary marketplace.40 Thus, in the twenty-first
century, the Western world’s “most advanced nation-states
continue to perpetuate the stereotypes and clichéd images of
human savagery that were first invented by the ancient Greeks to
justify their ongoing violations of the most basic human rights of
cultural survival belonging to indigenous tribal peoples.”41
Williams identifies these doctrines as the most dangerous threat
to the continuing survival of the world’s indigenous peoples
because it normalizes the hierarchical and exploitive relationship
created by colonialism.42 As Williams and Echo-Hawk point out,
the failure to recognize adequate legal rights to tribal cultural
38

See id. at 224–25. The Doctrine of Discovery was first applied under
international law to vacant lands in order to validate the ownership of the first
Nation to discover such lands. However, it was then extended during the era of
European colonialism to validate the claims of civilized Christian nations to
colonize areas inhabited by uncivilized and non-Christian peoples (heathens and
infidels in India and the Middle East, as well as Native peoples throughout the
Americas). Chief Justice John Marshall imported the Doctrine of Discovery into
Federal Indian law in the famous case of Johnson v. McIntosh, which held that
Great Britain and its successor, the United States, retained the fee interest in the
lands that they discovered and settled, except for the “right of occupancy”
(aboriginal title), which allowed Native people to remain in possession of their
lands until their title of occupancy was extinguished by the European sovereign
by purchase or conquest. See 21 U.S. 543 (1823). The Doctrine of Discovery
thus established a hierarchy of authority that subordinated Indigenous
governance systems.
39
WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 225.
40
See Marty Westerman, Death of the Frito Bandito, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS Mar.
1989, at 28.
41
Id. at 9.
42
Id.
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protection constitutes a compelling human rights problem in this
country. This battle is intangible, and therefore it remains unseen
and unacknowledged by most citizens in contemporary society,
even by some of those who are Indigenous. The battle involves
identity, power, and the right to claim the essence of an Indigenous
people as belonging to the European-derived nations that claim
rights through discovery. This mode of engagement served the
European nations as they appropriated Native lands, through the
concept of the “public domain,” and it continues to serve
descendants of European nations today as they appropriate Native
identities.43
There is clearly an element of racism at work, given the
cultural imagery of the savage. However, Federal Indian law neatly
sidesteps the issue of racism by affirming that federally-recognized
American Indian and Alaska Native governments are political,
rather than racial, groups, and that their rights are governed by the
unique rules of Federal Indian law, as opposed to the rules that
govern equality of citizenship for members of racial minorities.
With limited exceptions, contemporary U.S. civil rights law
disclaims the need to treat citizens differently based upon their
status as members of “racial or ethnic minority groups.”44 Today,
all laws that create race-based classifications, whether beneficial
(i.e., affirmative action) or harmful, are evaluated under strict
scrutiny for purposes of the equal protection clause.45 In
comparison, the United States routinely passes special legislation
43

See statement by Professor James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the rights of
Indigenous peoples, twenty-third session of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, Intergovernmental Commission, Feb. 4, 2013, at 3 (comparing
notion of the public domain with the Terra Nullius doctrine) [hereinafter
Professor Anaya statement].
44
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300u-6, 2000e-16 (2012) (government employment is
free from discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin”).
45
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all
racial classifications authorized by any governmental actor must be analyzed by
the reviewing court under strict scrutiny).
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to secure the political rights of the Native Nations that are in a trust
relationship with the United States.46 These laws are treated very
deferentially, applying only the minimal level of review to
determine whether they are rationally related to the government’s
trust responsibility.47
Today, tribal attorneys build on the Federal Indian law
framework to argue for Indigenous cultural rights under the
guidance of the political right to self-determination. As Professor
James Anaya points out, the norm of self-determination
encompasses a right to cultural integrity for Indigenous peoples.48
The self-determination argument works well with tangible
resources such as land and cultural patrimony. It is less successful
as applied to intangible resources because the relationship of
Native culture to self-determination is much more nuanced and
complex. This is due to the historical legacy of cultural imagery
that was employed to divest Indigenous peoples of their rights to
land and cultural identity, as well as the modern trend to normalize
“cultural borrowing” as a means to contemporary cultural
production.49 After 500 years of contact, the line between
European and Indigenous culture is blurred and any attempt to
fence out an intrusion or appropriation meets resistance unless it
falls within a classic case of copyright or trademark violation.
Furthermore, in the case of stereotyping, it is not always
obvious that the political status of tribal governments can insulate
them from the multiple harms that stereotyping causes to tribal
46

Title 25 of the U.S. Code is devoted to the rights of tribal governments. See 25
U.S.C. §§ 1–44 (2012).
47
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed.”).
48
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2d ed.
2004).
49
See Christine Hoff Kraemer, Cultural Borrowing/Cultural Appropriation: A
Relationship Model For Respectful Borrowing, 2 THORN MAG. 36 (2009).
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identity, and individually to tribal members.50 Indeed, as
philosopher Miranda Fricker points out, our basic social
interactions tend to have profound impacts upon particular groups,
and epistemic injustice can arise when individuals are harmed in
their ability to convey knowledge to others or to make sense of
their own experience.51 In such cases, the “politics of epistemic
practice” determine how social power operates to produce injustice
in everyday social practices. A group can be harmed in its ability
to participate equally in creating a given social experience,
including defining what constitutes art.52 Is art the individual
creation of an artist? Does it comprise the tribe’s own form of
culturally authorized cultural production; through songs, designs,
ceremonies, symbols, and the like? According to Fricker, when a
group is excluded from exerting power within an institution, such
as legislative or judicial bodies, which controls the terms of their
own experience, injustice arises.53 Similarly, when individuals who
object to the dominant system are targeted as militants or not
representative of the group itself, they suffer a further injustice that
impairs their ability to convey valid or relevant information
because they have been labeled as unreliable or not meriting
credibility. Indigenous peoples have been affected by epistemic
injustice in many categories of public policy and these dynamics
exist in the current debates over Native control over culture and
art.54
The next section will discuss the impact of stereotyping as a
form of identity harm, arguing that certain forms of cultural

50

E.g., CNN Wire Staff, Native Americans Object to Linking Geronimo to bin
Laden,
CNN
(May
6,
2011,
5:55
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/05/bin.laden.geronimo/index.html.
51
See MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF
KNOWING 1 (2007).
52
Id. at 153–54.
53
Id.
54
See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice:
Science, Ethics, and Human Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1133 (2012).
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production are employed to negate the ability of tribal
governments to control intangible aspects of cultural heritage.
III. NATIONAL IDENTITY, TRIBAL IDENTITY,
AND IDENTITY HARM
The law is a social institution that broadly involves power
relations between the national government and its citizens, and
between the United States and Native Nations. In the former case,
the government and its citizens share a political identity within
civil society, although pluralistic democracies must manage
diverse cultural identities. Modern pluralistic democracies, such as
the United States, tend to do this under the project of
“multiculturalism,” which Professor Steven Vertovec describes as
a diversity management strategy that promotes “tolerance and
respect for collective identities” associated with specific cultural
groups.55 This requires an overall understanding of the dominant
identity of the national government, as well as the careful
management of racial and ethnic minorities to ensure that they
enjoy equal citizenship, meaning equal access to political and civil
rights. Notably, under this model, religion and other forms of
cultural differences are tolerated and accommodated to the extent
possible, consistent with other national objectives.56 However,
there is no right to culture within the United States, and therefore,
attributes of minority cultures, such as language and other cultural
practices, are not affirmatively protected or preserved, unless they
are part of the national culture, such as designated historic sites.57
The question of what belongs within the dominant cultural
identity of the national government, and what belongs within the
minority group’s cultural identity, may be clear in Great Britain
and other European countries. However, it is a difficult question in
55

See Steven Vertovec, Super-Diversity and Its Implications, 30 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 1024, 1027, 1047 (2007).
56
Id. at 1027.
57
See Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24 at 332-46 (identifying
the arguments for and against legal protection for a “right to culture”).
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settler nations, such as the United States, Canada, and New
Zealand, at least in relation to Indigenous peoples. In the quest for
a separate national identity, the United States, like many other
settler countries, appropriated Indigenous land and cultural
imagery as a way to establish its own identity separately from its
British forebears. This is clearly demonstrated by the role of the
museum in settler states, such as Canada, the United States, New
Zealand, and Australia, which focused on “creating a common
identity for the new nation, pluralistic in nature, descended from
Europe, but located on new lands separated from Europe.”58
Throughout its history, the United States has appropriated
Indigenous names and symbols to build federal power, including
use of Native images and identities on U.S. currency, and military
operations and equipment (e.g. the Apache helicopter, “Operation
Geronimo”).59 Similarly, the United States has built a national
creation mythology around the encounter of Europeans with
Indians (e.g. Pocahontas and John Rolfe, Sacajawea and Lewis and
Clark).60 Even if the images portray Native people positively, they
are invoked to build the country’s national identity.
Conversely, the negative stereotypes of the Indian as a
“savage” that Professor Williams discusses were used to justify
federal paternalism to take Indian land, children, religions, and
cultural objects for the “good of the Indians” in the nineteenth
century.61 Although modern policymakers disclaim any continuing
intent to invoke cultural racism, stereotypes about Native peoples
persists in American culture, politics, and sports, thus perpetuating
the historical consciousness about Native identity within
58

Rebecca Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums: Developing an Institutional
Framework for Cultural Sovereignty, 45 U. TULSA L. REV. 3, 6 (2000).
59
‘Geronimo’: Native Americans Blast Bin Laden Code Name,
NBCNEWS.COM,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42897871/ns/world_newsdeath_of_bin_laden/t/geronimo-native-americans-blast-bin-laden-codename/#.VVMIWkaGNqw (last updated May 4, 2011).
60
Gover, supra note 31.
61
See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology, supra note 9 at
403.
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contemporary society. It is important to note that this national
consciousness undermines the ability of Indigenous peoples to
participate as equals in the construction of their contemporary
identities, labeling such exercises as mere efforts to establish what
is politically correct. In this world, the “good” Indian still passively
relies on the non-Indian benefactor to create value for tribal
existence, as demonstrated by Dan Snyder’s attempt to gain the
support of nationally recognized tribal leaders and organizations
for the Washington Team’s mascot. The “bad” Indians who
demonstrate and voice opposition are dismissed as troublemakers
and malcontents, as were the nineteenth century Indigenous patriot
leaders, such as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Geronimo. The end
result is that the United States government maintains the power to
use Native identities for its purposes without being accountable for
the harms to Native peoples. In fact, the use of cultural imagery is
often protected as freedom of expression for purposes of the U.S.
Constitution.62
Clearly, American Indian and Alaska Native peoples have been
affected by stereotypes throughout history. For purposes of this
essay, it is necessary to examine who controls the image of the
“Indian” in contemporary society. Are cultural images and
identities considered property, in the sense that they can be owned
and commercialized? Or are these images merely ideas that are
beyond government regulation and are available for appropriation
by others?
A. Stereotyping and Identity Harm
Stereotyping is a primary source of prejudice in which a biased
attitude can manifest in legally prohibited behavior, such as
discrimination, but is not, itself, actionable.63 For this reason, the
case against stereotyping is best made by identifying its function.
62

Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 347-49 (2002).
63
Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591 (2011)
(discussing how stereotyping becomes actionable as discrimination).
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Miranda Fricker describes stereotypes as “widely held associations
between a given social group and one or more attributes.”64 Fricker
asserts that stereotyping is one of the primary ways in which
members of a society make “credibility judgments” about other
members, to include them, privilege them, or exclude them from a
given social practice.65 In this way, stereotyping is linked to other
forms of injustice and can serve as a means of invoking identity
power.
Identity power is of particular importance because many social
interactions depend upon the participants’ mutual understanding of
their social power.66 Feminist scholars, for example, point out that
men can use their male identity to influence a woman, perhaps by
patronizing or intimidating her.67
These subtle forms of
domination, sometimes framed as “microaggressions,” are not
actionable under the law as gender discrimination, and yet, they
may have a very harmful impact upon women’s rights to equality
under the law.68 Similarly, tribal governments should care deeply
about forms of cultural imagery that are used to portray Native
peoples, because those stereotypes link up to a variety of harms,
64

FRICKER, supra note 51, at 30.
Id.
66
Id. at 14 (“Whenever there is an oprtaion of power that depends in some
significant degree upon…shared imaginative conceptions of social identify, then
identity power is at work.”)
67
Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice, supra note 54, at 1154
(citing id. at 17).
68
Robin Lukes & Joann Bangs, A Critical Analysis of Anti-Discrimination Law
and Microagressions in Academia, 24 RES. HIGHER EDUC. J. 1, 3 (2014) (“By
their very nature, many microaggressions are not legally prohibited, because
they are ‘everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or
insults.’” (quoting DERALD WING SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 7 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010)),
available at http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/141824.pdf); see Derald Wing
Sue, Microaggressions: More than Just Race, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN
EVERYDAY
LIFE
(Nov.
17,
2010),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/microaggressions-in-everydaylife/201011/microaggressions-more-just-race.
65
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including economic exploitation, or, in the case of Native women,
interpersonal violence. 69
As Professor Anita Bernstein demonstrates in her article
What’s Wrong With Stereotyping?, contemporary stereotyping
represents a struggle between liberty and equality.70 Those who
maintain that they have a constitutionally protected right to engage
in symbolic speech, such as the use of mascots and other forms of
negative cultural imagery about other groups, are asserting a
degree of liberty that has adverse consequences for other groups,
such as racial minorities and women. Stereotyping adversely
affects those groups by constraining their opportunities, but the law
does not acknowledge this harm. Instead, proponents of liberty
often point out that all groups stereotype each other (Republicans
and Democrats, Yankees and Southerners, Texans and New
Yorkers, French and English, Catholics and Protestants) because
all groups have a “type” (a set of characteristics and mannerisms)
which is invoked, often humorously (e.g. the “redneck”) to poke
fun at one’s own group or others. In other words, this is just what
people do. What is the harm?
Bernstein responds by noting that if groups operate on an equal
basis of power in their social interactions, stereotyping is not
harmful and it quite frequently is humorous.71 However, she points
out that there are several stereotypes that we should care about
because they affect vulnerable groups and perpetuate harm by
painting the vulnerable group as stupid, crazy, irrational, violent,
predatory, brutish, or subhuman.72 In these cases, there is a
historical pattern to the use of stereotypes that identify traits
associated with the group that (1) denigrates the group, (2)
substantiates the dominant consciousness that the trait is actually
69

Shan Li, supra note 11 (cultural imagery sexualizes native women and
promotes sexual violence).
70
See Anita Bernstein, What's Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655
(2013).
71
Id. at 664.
72
Id. at 665.
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true, and therefore (3) justifies a negative assertion of social power
to control the group.73 This dynamic was also invoked by the
Framers of the Constitution to justify the assertion that African
peoples, who were imported into the United States to serve as
slaves, should be counted as three fifths of a person74 while white
persons were counted as full persons. This diminished status was
justified by the view, expressed most overtly in the infamous Dred
Scott case, that Africans, as a race, possessed a set of inferior traits
that made enslavement the best destiny for them.75 Justice Taney
wrote that Africans had, for more than a century, been “regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race.”76 He found that they had been regarded as having
“no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.”77
Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, this form
of dehumanizing imagery justified the social subordination of
African American people under the distorted logic of Plessy v.
Ferguson, which described racism as a social problem, rather than
a legal problem, thereby justifying official government policies of
segregation as a permissible form of social management.78 The
separate-but-equal doctrine established by Plessy79 was ultimately
overruled in the realm of K-12 public school education by the 1954

73

Id. at 720.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76
Id. at 407.
77
Id.
78
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79
Id. at 551, 561 (upholding Louisiana law segregating public transportation by
restricting railway carriages for “white” and “colored” citizens on the theory that
“separate but equal accommodations” regulate social norms and are therefore
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s call for political equality).
74
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Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education,80 followed
by the more comprehensive reforms of the Civil Rights Act of
196481 and subsequent civil rights legislation. However, racial
equality remains elusive in the United States. Today, our society
espouses “formal equality,” meaning that we resist most overt
racial classifications. Yet, implicit racial biases are deeply
embedded, and today the negative assertion of power can manifest
as prejudice, which is generally not actionable because it is a
private state of mind, or as discrimination, which is actionable if it
violates a civil rights statute, for example, a landlord’s refusal to
rent property based on the tenant’s racial status.
Within contemporary society, the overt racism of the past has
evolved into covert racism, a shadow form of disparate treatment
that remains unseen by many members of society.82 These negative
assertions of power can be masked as “neutral” policies (e.g.,
sentencing laws that have disparate impacts upon racial groups),
and can also undergird racial profiling and disparate use of force to
subdue African American “suspects,” most recently demonstrated
by the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri.83 Months after the fatal
shooting of Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old black man, by
80

Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that racially segregated public
schools are “inherently unequal” because they deny equal educational
opportunity to children and impede their development as citizens in a
democratic society).
81
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
82
See William Y. Chin, The Age of Covert Racism in the Era of the Roberts
Court During the Waning of Affirmative Action, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1,
1–2 (2015).
83
James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau Investigation, Address at Georgetown
University (Feb. 12, 2015) (presenting on the role of implicit bias in criminal
justice system), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-lawenforcement-and-race; see also Kevin Johnson & Yamiche Alcindor, DOJ:
Ferguson PD Engaged In Racially Biased Policing, USA TODAY (Mar. 3,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/03/ferguson-justicereport/24320987/.
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Officer Darren Wilson, a white law enforcement officer, the U.S.
Department of Justice released a report demonstrating that the
Ferguson Police Department engaged in “a broad pattern of
racially biased enforcement . . . including the use of unreasonable
force against African American suspects.”84 Specifically, the report
documents that 88% of the cases involving use of force in
Ferguson concerned African American suspects.85 The statistics
may speak for themselves, but they also align with a history of
cultural imagery depicting African American males as violent and
given to criminal behavior, which has consistently resulted in a
violation of the human rights and civil rights of African American
people.
B. Native American Mascots and Identity Harm
Similarly, the use of cultural imagery as a mechanism to
subordinate the rights of Native American peoples has been
operative throughout history. Professor Williams’ work highlights
the impact of the construction of Indigenous peoples as
“savages.”86 The contemporary use of Indian images as sports
mascots illustrates the continuing nature of the problem. The use of
these images originated at a time in American history when overt
racism and bigotry was the norm in American society.87 However,
today these images are worth millions of dollars as a property
interest in the hands of sports franchises such as the Washington
Team, the Kansas City Chiefs, the Cleveland Indians, the Atlanta
Braves, and the Chicago Blackhawks.88 Because the use of Native
American cultural imagery has been normalized within American
society, generations of Americans have grown up with their own
84

Johnson & Alcindor, supra note 83.
Id.
86
WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 1.
87
See NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, ENDING THE LEGACY OF RACISM IN
SPORTS AND THE ERA OF HARMFUL “INDIAN” SPORTS MASCOTS 2 (October 2013)
[hereinafter NCAI REPORT], available at
http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncaipublications/Ending_the_Legacy_of_Racism.pdf.
88
Id.
85
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ideas about what they ought to be able to do, which includes the
use of Indian mascots, even though they would no longer be
willing to use overt cultural imagery to mock African Americans,
Latinos, or Asians.89 Although two-thirds of Indian sports images
and mascots have been eliminated from use during the past thirtyfive years, following a course of activism by Native peoples and
support by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, as well as a host
of other professional organizations and associations, there are still
over 1,000 Indian sports images in active use, and the Washington
Team continues to litigate its right to trademark the “Redskins”
team name and image.90
What accounts for the disparity between the treatment of these
other groups and Native Americans? African Americans, Latinos,
and Asians constitute much larger groups within U.S. society,
wielding significant economic and political clout, while Native
Americans continue to represent less than 2% of the U.S.
population.91 But, the fact that the team owners continue to profit
from the use of Native American images as sports mascots means
that it is palatable to most Americans to consider these images to
be the property of non-Native people. Native images have
economic value to American society, demonstrating that the third
phase of colonialism is actively in progress. In addition, the use of
these images aligns with the intuition of Americans that cultural
imagery is a form of constitutionally protected expression
(symbolic speech)92 that merits protection as a liberty interest. And
89

The “Frito Bandito” and “Little Black Sambo,” for example, disappeared from
commercial use during the 1970s. Frito Bandito, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frito_Bandito (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); Marty,
Westerman, Death of the Frito Bandito, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS (Mar.
1989); Marjorie Rosenthal, Banned From American Bookshelves: The Story Of
Little Black Sambo, LONG ISLAND BOOK COLLECTORS (Aug. 11, 2013),
http://longislandbookcollectors.com/2013/%EF%BB%BFbanned-fromamerican-bookshelves-the-story-of-little-black-sambo.
90
NCAI REPORT, supra note 87, at 6, 10–15.
91
Id. at 5.
92
Examples of protected symbolic speech can be found in Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning), United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)
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finally, the use of Native American cultural imagery is not cast as
racism, but as a way to “honor” the Native American people. In
other words, Americans have created themselves, through the use
of Native American cultural imagery, a continuation of the
dynamic that Williams describes in relation to the mythology of
the “savage” as means to construct Western civilization.
Within the third phase of colonialism, the commercial value of
“Indian identity” belongs to non-Indians. This is being litigated
right now in federal court, following a recent ruling by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., which cancelled six active
trademark registrations for the “Redskins” on the grounds that this
symbol disparages Native American people within the meaning of
the federal Trademark laws.93 This ruling is currently being
challenged by the Washington Team in a federal district court
lawsuit that seeks to protect the right of the team to profit from the
name.94 If the Native American petitioners prevail, the use of the
term “Redskins” will lack Trademark protection, meaning that ProFootball, Inc. will have no federally protected property interest in
the team name. This ruling, of course, does not affect the ability of
individuals or corporations to use the term in other ways that
would be offensive to Native American people.
For example, several years ago, the Hornell Brewing Company
used the name of a revered nineteenth century Lakota leader,
(flag burning), and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a
draft card), among others.
93
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see
also Zoe Tillman, Judge Rules Redskins Trademark Case Can Move Forward,
LEGALTIMES (Nov. 25, 2014 12:09 P.M.),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202677398589/Judge-RulesRedskins-Trademark-Defense-Can-Move-Forward?slreturn=20150228133911
(discussing ruling of U.S. District Court Judge Gerald Bruce Lee which denied
motion of Native American petitioners to dismiss the appeal, finding that ProFootball has a significant economic interest in the Trademarks which justifies
appeal).
94
Tillman, supra note 93.
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Crazy Horse, to market a Malt Liquor product: “Crazy Horse Malt
Liquor.”95 At the request of outraged tribal leaders, Congress held
hearings on the matter and concluded that the name should be
cancelled because the company was intentionally marketing the
product to Native youth and creating further social problems for
these impoverished communities with high rates of alcoholism,
traffic related fatalities, and youth suicides.96 The federal court
disagreed, holding that the company’s use of the name was
constitutionally protected commercial speech, and that the
government had impermissibly acted by banning the speech.97
When the descendants of Crazy Horse attempted to sue Hornell
Brewing Company in tribal court for a cultural tort, based upon
defamation of their ancestor’s spirit and the family by
unauthorized use of the leader’s name to market liquor, the federal
courts held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the Hornell
Brewing Company, which was not doing business on the
reservation.98
The above cases demonstrate that harms to a name or cultural
identity are not actionable unless they can be tied to a specific
violation of existing law. So, for example, tribal governments have
a legal right to regulate the use of their tribal name through
trademark law. As an aspect of their authority, they can license use
of the tribal name to third parties (as the Seminoles have done) or
they can prosecute unauthorized uses of the tribal name, as the
Navajo Nation did with Urban Outfitters.99 Contemporary Native
95

Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy
Horse in Tribal Court, BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
APPROPRIATION 195, 201 (Bruce Ziff & Patima V. Rao eds. 1997).
96
102 CONG. REC. S13, 420 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992).
97
Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
98
Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1093
(9th Cir. 1998).
99
The Seminole Tribe of Florida has authorized Florida State University to
retain the “Seminoles” Team name. See Robert Andrew Powell, Florida State
Can Keep its Seminoles, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 24, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/sports/24mascot.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0. The Navajo Nation successfully challenged the use of
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artists and tribal governments can invoke the provisions of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act to prevent non-Indians from falsely
marketing their goods as “Indian made” or the product of a specific
Indian tribe.100 Both actions constitute a form of deceptive
advertising that causes consumer harm.101 Tribal governments do
not generally retain the exclusive right to produce particular art
forms, such as rugs or baskets, even if there are distinctive design
qualities to these traditional arts. So long as the producer of an
item is, in fact, “Indian” for purposes of the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act, he or she has the right to freely produce “Indian” art.
Conversely, so long as a producer of an item correctly labels his or
her art as “inspired by Native American designs,” he or she may
freely appropriate Indigenous art forms. Individual Native
American artists generally have the same rights as any artist to
obtain protection for their own unique creations under the U.S.
copyright laws,102 and they have the additional right under the
the term “Navajo” on Urban Outfitters clothing designs. Navajo Nation v. Urban
Outfitters, Inc., 935 F.Supp.2d 1147 (D.N.M. 2013); see also Caroline Jamet,
Urban Outfitters Sued for Trademark Infringement by Navajo Nation, INTELL.
PROP. BRIEF: AM. U. WASH. C.
L. (June 18, 2012),
http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/06/18/urban-outfitters-sued-for-trademarkinfringement-by-navajo-nation/.
100
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305e (2012).
101
False advertising is defined as “[t]he tortious and sometimes criminal act of
distributing an advertisement that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading; esp. under
the Lanham Act, an advertising statement that tends to mislead consumers about
the characteristics, quality, or geographic origin of one’s own or someone else’s
goods, services, or commercial activity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (10th
ed. 2014).
102
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing copyrightable subject matter). See
also The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (expanding
rights of orators of visual art to include the rights of “attribution” and
“integrity.”); see Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25
at 3-5 (discussing conceptual problems within the law that regulates protection
of Indigenous cultural heritage due to the inability of the law to adequately
distinguish “objects of art” from “cultural objects”); see also Dr. Jane Anderson,
“Access and Control of Indigenous Knowledge in Libraries and Archives:
Ownership and Future Use,” (May 5-7, 2005) at p. 9 (quoting Australian
Indigenous leader Mick Dodson, who stated that “our laws and customs do not
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Indian Arts and Crafts Act to label their cultural productions as an
“Indian product.”103 However, as the next section demonstrates,
individual artists and tribal governments generally lack the right to
control the use of traditional cultural expression beyond these
specific legal categories.104
IV. CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE RIGHTS OF
NATIVE ARTISTS
There is a profound conceptual problem at the heart of debates
about art as a means of cultural production, which is, that “art” is a
category defined by Western views about the relationship of
persons to objects, and the categories of legal protection that are
available to artists are aligned with that conception.105 Western
philosophy and law worked in tandem to construct the categories
of “art” and “artifacts” to differentiate the rights of Western
authors who create works of “art” from those of non-Western
cultures who produce “artifacts.” Today, individual Native artists
are actively engaged in cultural production, and there are also
significant repositories of tribal art and art forms in the archives of
museums and libraries throughout the nation and the world.
Indigenous art forms are intergenerational expressions of culture.
However, because of the continuing conceptual problems that
relate to the categories of “art” and “artifacts,” as well as what
merits protection under U.S. copyright or trademark law, there is
significant confusion about what rights, if any, exist in these
tangible and intangible expressions of culture.106
fit easily into the pre-existing categories of the Western system. The legal
system does not even know precisely what it is in our societies that is in need of
protection. The existing legal system cannot properly embrace what it cannot
define and that is what lies at the heart of the problem.”) (emphasis added by
Anderson).
103
25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305e.
104
See Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25.
105
Id.
106
See Olivia J. Greer, Using Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Indigenous
Cultural Property, 22 NYSBA 27 (discussing the inability of U.S. intellectual
property law to “prevent the unauthorized exploitation of tangible and intangible
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A. The Historic Framing of Art as Cultural Production
In contemporary America, “art” is perceived as a commodity in
the hands of consumers, and creators have limited rights to their
original expression, which are defined by copyright law.107 Our
domestic legal system regulates the economic aspects of art as an
enterprise by offering a limited incentive to creators to produce
original art for the market. However, ideas are freely exchanged
and therefore a robust public domain is perceived as necessary to
serve the public interest in innovation and free expression.
Traditional Indigenous art forms are largely seen as part of the
public domain because they are ancient “tribal” cultures and there
are many “creators” who share this tradition, rather than one
individual “artist.” In addition, many outsiders see tribal designs as
“generic” because they are disassociated from their original
cultural context and the meaning of the symbols is not understood
by contemporary consumers.108 In other words, the entire
conception of “art” is defined by the relationship of the
viewer/consumer to the object, which has been created by the
artist. This set of relationships is embedded within the Western
philosophy of aesthetics.109
indigenous cultural property”); Anderson, Access and Control of Indigenous
Knowledge in Libraries and Archives, supra note 102 at 33 (concluding that the
failure of existing law to protect Indigenous cultural knowledge and art forms is
promoting the institutional development and use of “protocols” which can
“prescribe modes of conduct through emphasizing or normalizing particular
forms of cultural engagement”); Kimberly Christen, Opening Archives:
Respectful Repatriation, 74 AM. ARCHIVIST 185 (2011) (discussing a
“collaborative archival project aimed at digitally repatriating and reciprocally
curating cultural heritage materials of the Plateau tribes in the Pacific
Northwest”).
107
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
108
See Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25 at
5-7 (discussing Native and Western cultural views about “art” and “artifacts”).
109
See Stephen Davies, Aesthetic Judgments, Artworks and Functional Beauty,
56 PHIL. Q. 224–41 (2006) (explaining the historic construction of aesthetics and
the ways in which non-Western cultures were excluded from the framework
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Within the philosophy of aesthetics that constructed the
category of art, the individual artist is understood to create a work
(painting, novel, sculpture, musical arrangement) that evokes a
specific response from the viewer. According to Western
philosophers, “aesthetic judgment” in the observer is premised on
an attitude of “disinterested contemplation,” in which the viewer
focuses on the item’s intrinsic, non-relational, and immediately
perceptible properties.110 Thus, the Western concept of art
encompasses objects and things that are susceptible of aesthetic
appreciation and the more sophisticated and original the work is,
the more it is protected by the law as an original work. Original
authorship is the key to earning rights within the Western
copyright system. The artist is rewarded with certain rights to
incentivize his or her creation, and after a specific duration of time,
the work will fall into the public domain to serve as inspiration for
other artists.111
Of course, the philosophy of aesthetics represents a
distinctively Western experience. Under the philosophy of
aesthetics, tribal art is generally placed within the category of
“artifacts,” which is a vast repository of “primitive” and “nonWestern” cultural expression. “Artifacts” are not considered “art”
even if they contain elements that inspire aesthetic appreciation.
This is why so much “tribal art” ended up in museums of natural
history in the nineteenth century, rather than art museums.112
Western aesthetics also excluded from the cultural category of art
“phenomena” that lack significant aspects of “human design” and
appeared to largely reflect “objects of nature” (arrangements of
shells on a string, for example). To the Western “observer,” tribal
cultural expression generally falls into the category of “artifacts”
governing art and the rights of creators); see generally STEPHEN DAVIES, THE
ARTFUL SPECIES: AESTHETICS, ART, AND EVOLUTION (2012) (discussing the
possibility of how aesthetics may be partly determined by human biology).
110
See Stephen Davies, Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition, THEORIES OF ART
TODAY 199, 201–02 (Noël Carroll ed., 2000).
111
17 U.S.C. §§ 302–03 (2012) (stating the duration of a copyright in a work).
112
See Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums, supra note 58, at 7.
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or “phenomena.” The creator(s) are not considered to have rights
of authorship, and therefore tribal designs and symbols are freely
appropriated by others as merely “design” elements.113
Because modern art collectors often trade in “primitive art,” the
art market must regulate what is the cultural patrimony of nations
(for example, Mexico claims a national right to pre-Columbian
art), as well as the private property of museums, which are
constantly embattled by theft of original works and fraudulent
reproductions. Native American cultural patrimony is regulated by
statutes such as the Archaeological Resources Protection Act,
which protects archaeological resources that are 100 years of age
or older on federal and tribal lands,114 and the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which criminalizes
trafficking of tribal cultural patrimony and sacred objects.115
However, there is no domestic law regulating the intangible
category of tribal cultural expression. There are countless images
on the internet that reflect Native American people, including
individuals in photographs; and tribal symbols, songs, designs, and
art forms.116 The question is how to regulate the use of these
images. Who owns tribal images and identities in the modern era?

113

See generally Kathy M’Closkey, Up for Grabs: Assessing the Consequences
of Sustained Appropriations of Navajo Wavers’ Patterns, in NO DEAL!:
INDIGENOUS ARTS AND THE POLITICS OF POSSESSION 128, 129–132 (Tressa
Berman ed., 2012) (discussing how the Navajos’ rug market was flooded by
cheap “knock-off” rugs because the Navajos could not protect their weaving
patterns under U.S. law).
114
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm
(2012).
115
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
3001–13 (2012).
116
See Kimberly Christen, Opening Archives supra note 106 at 193 (noting that
“Digital technologies and the Internet have combined to produce both the
possibility of greater indigenous access to collections, as well as a new set of
tensions for communities” who seek to enforce cultural protocols for dealing
with circulation of those materials).
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B. Indigenous Perspectives on Art as Cultural Production
The late Elouise Cobell, a Blackfeet woman who was an
acclaimed tribal leader, activist, and entrepreneur, said, “Art is the
greatest asset Indian people have in our communities, yet it is the
most underdeveloped.”117 A recent study on the economic value of
art to Native communities found that “an estimated 30% of all
Native peoples are practicing or potential artists and most live
below the poverty line.”118 The same study examined the situation
of emerging Native artists and found that they reported an annual
household income of less than $10,000.119 Native artists living on
reservations are largely working through home-based enterprises
for a cash income.120 They often live hundreds or even thousands
of miles from the urban art markets. They may lack access to
electronic markets121 and they may instead rely upon non-Native
gallery owners and agents to market their work to collectors.
Clearly, as a group, Native artists lack direct access to a significant
portion of the market122 Because of their disadvantaged status, they
are also likely to lack the resources to obtain legal advice on how
to use existing intellectual property law to protect their rights as
individual artists. In that sense, Native artists are “underserved” by
the contemporary legal structure.
As Ms. Cobell noted, however, cultural expression has always
been of vital importance to Native peoples.123 Language and art are

117

ARTSPACE, KATHLEEN PICKERING SHERMAN, FIRST PEOPLES FUND,
LEVERAGING INVS. IN CREATIVITY, NW AREA FOUND., ESTABLISHING A
CREATIVE ECONOMY: ART AS AN ECONOMIC ENGINE IN NATIVE COMMUNITIES 9
(Marianna
Shay,
2013),
available
at
https://www.firstpeoplesfund.org/assets/uploads/documents/document-marketstudy.pdf.
118
Id. at 7.
119
Id. at 17.
120
See id. at 8–9.
121
See id. at 11–12.
122
See id.
123
See id at 1.
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linked to tribal, cultural, and spiritual identity.124 And Native art
reflects the expression of living cultures, which are linked
intergenerationally to their ancestors and the generations yet to be
born.125 Because Native art forms often embody traditional
practices, including notions of stewardship and appropriate
transmission of knowledge, it is incumbent upon Native
communities to have the power to regulate cultural art forms. This
is the genesis of movements to establish a “cultural trademark” to
identify authentic Indigenous art and protect against
misappropriation. For example, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
funded a Native Hawaiian Cultural Trademark study, which
culminated in a 2007 report recommending the use of a cultural
trademark program to protect the authenticity of Native Hawaiian
art and the cultural transmission of knowledge that Native
Hawaiian arts embody.126 The Report documented the many issues
that arise with any form of cultural certification, but recommended
a process that would be consistent with Native Hawaiian practices
of cultural transmission of knowledge and the genealogy of Native
Hawaiian peoples.127
The Maori “Toi Iho” Cultural Trademark program in Aotearoa
(New Zealand) is cited by the authors of this report as a model.128
The Maori “Toi Iho” Certification Trademark was created by a
statute passed by the New Zealand parliament “to assist Maori to
retain control over their cultural heritage and maintain the integrity
of their art culture in an increasingly commercialized world.”129
The legislation specified that the Certification Mark would be
administered through the Arts Council of New Zealand in
124

Id. at 5.
Id.
126
See HO’OIPO KALAENA’AUAO PA, HALE KU’AI STUDY GRP., NATIVE
HAWAIIAN CULTURAL TRADEMARK STUDY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
38–40
(2007),
available
at
http://hawaiiantrademarkstudy.com/Media/TrademarkStudyReport.pdf.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 37–43.
129
Id. at 37.
125
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consultation with a parallel Maori arts agency, Te Waka Toi
Cultural Arts Board.”130 The Maori Arts Board is pivotal to the
implementation of the program, and the actual Certification Mark
is premised on the “Iho,” which is the essence of creation and the
origin of Maori knowledge and tradition, representing the core of
Maori arts.131 From this core symbol, emanate the “whakapapa” or
genealogy lines of past, present and future generations, and there
are colored spires in the design, which represent the creativity,
innovation, and the dynamism of Maori artists.132
Through the use of the Maori cultural trademark, the Maori
people have assumed governing authority over their culture and its
expression in authentic Maori art that is genealogically and
culturally tied to Aotearoa.133 This includes the traditional art
forms of Maori people, which have a rich tradition of transmission
of knowledge. But, it also includes the modern creations and
innovations of contemporary Maori artists, who are engaged in a
process of cultural production that reflects modern cultural
identity. This is a very powerful example of what could happen for
Native artists in the United States as a means to exert governance
authority over Native American cultural production.

130

Id.
Id.
132
Id. at 39.
133
Id. at 39. But see Jessica C. Lai, Maori Culture in the Modern World: Its
Creation, Appropriation, and Trade 24 (Int’l Commc’ns & Art Law Lucerne,
Working Paper No. 02, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961482 (“On its inception,
toi iho was considered to be a world-leading initiative, often cited as a model to
be used by other Indigenous peoples. However, the current National
Government has decided to cease investment, management, licensing and
promotion of toi iho. Creative New England stated that market research showed
that it had not achieved increased sales of Maori art by licensed artists or
retailers.”); LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., NEW
ZEALAND: MAORI CULTURE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2010),
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/nz-maori-culture/nz-maori-cultureand-intellectual-property-law.pdf.
131
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In the United States, inequities extend beyond the level of the
individual artist to the level of the Indigenous group as a collective.
Many American Indian and Alaska Native Nations continue to
possess cultural methods of regulating tribal art forms. However,
with a few exceptions, the idea of a “cultural trademark” for
specific Indigenous nations has not received sustained attention. In
the United States, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act is the only law
that protects tribal governments and artisans from overt attempts
by non-Indians to falsely market their goods as “Indian-made.”134
However, the federal law is designed to avoid consumer confusion
and not to substantiate tribal claims to cultural identity.135 There
are 566 federally recognized tribal governments in the United
States, representing many distinctive cultures and language
groups.136 But the cultural distinctiveness of American Indian and
Alaska Native Nations is often not seen. Rather, symbols such as
the “dream catcher” become part of a generic Indian identity,
which is widely appropriated by others. As of 2015, there is no
domestic law in the United States regulating the appropriation of
intangible tribal cultural heritage. Rather, the discussion of what
rights Indigenous peoples have to their “traditional cultural
expressions” is largely taking place in the international arena
through the agencies of the United Nations and the World
Intellectual Property Organization.137
The nation-states possess governing authority within those
structures and the dominant system of international trade depends
upon a robust public domain to serve the commercial interests of

134

See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2012); see also Kelly Mauceri, Note, Of Fakes and
Frauds: An Analysis of National American Intangible Cultural Property
Protection, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 268 (2007).
135
Mauceri, supra note 134.
136
INDIAN ENTITIES RECOGNIZED AND ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE SERVICES FROM
THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14,
2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-14/pdf/201500509.pdf.
137
Draft Articles, supra note 32.
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consumers and producers in a global economy.138 Today,
intangible cultural heritage is increasingly stored in electronic
databases.139 These archives of “traditional cultural expressions”
currently lack clear definition of ownership. Does ownership go to
the person or persons who created the database or archive? Does it
go to the individuals who produced the recorded expression? Does
it go to the Indigenous communities these individuals belong to?
Or are these archives part of the “common heritage of all
mankind,” an open-access resource and creative commons from
which others may liberally borrow for their own purposes?
The policy discussion about cultural production will benefit
from careful thinking and planning. Indigenous nations should
develop their own governance for traditional cultural expression
and should be actively involved in the dialogue about the
relationship between art and cultural identity.
V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGULATING INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL EXPRESSION
As this essay has demonstrated, the protection of Indigenous
cultural heritage in the United States is limited and largely depends
upon the existence of a federal law, such as NAGPRA or the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which validates specific rights of
Indigenous peoples, although the underlying right is often
138

See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE:
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (CHRISTOPHER B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT, &
JESSICA C. LAI eds., 2012). See also Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, Note by the Secretariat: Note on the Meanings of the Term “Public
Domain” in the Intellectual Property System with Special Reference to the
Protection
of
Traditional
Knowledge
and
Traditional
Cultural
Expression/Expressions of Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17 (Nov. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Intergovernmental Committee on IP] (“Maintaining a rich and
robust public domain is commonly put forward as an important public policy
goal.”).
139
See Anderson, supra note 102, and Christen, supra note 106, and
accompanying text.
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grounded upon Indigenous customary law.140 To some extent,
Indigenous customary law may be incorporated into specific
federal laws. For example, under NAGPRA, the very definition of
categories, such as “sacred objects” and “objects of cultural
patrimony” depends upon the cultural construction given to a
particular item by the Native American group under its traditional
law.141 The federal laws protecting Indigenous cultural heritage are
exceptional in relation to the general statutory and Constitutional
laws of the United States, and the fact that they exist at all is
directly related to the advocacy of Native leaders for redress of
egregious historical conduct by the United States toward
Indigenous peoples.142
Traditional cultural expression is not currently regulated by
U.S. domestic law, and international organizations have struggled
to define the term in a meaningful way, as illustrated by the 2013
effort of WIPO to create a draft treaty on the governance of
traditional cultural expression.143 If the term is defined broadly as
an expansive “cultural commons” which is not protected by
existing intellectual property law, then the presumption will be that
the nation-states control the overarching governance of Indigenous
cultural expression and have the power to include these groups
within certain “exceptional” forms of domestic statutory protection
(such as the Indian Arts and Crafts Act), or exclude them from
protection, enabling the appropriation of Native cultural expression
at will by innovative Westerners. In his role as the U.N. Special
140

See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See 25 USC section 3001 (3) (C) (defining “sacred objects” with reference to
traditional Native American religious practices) and (D) (defining “cultural
patrimony” with reference to the value accorded under Native American cultural
traditions).
142
See Senator Daniel K. Inouye, “Repatriation: Forging New Relationships,”
24 Ariz. St. L. J. 1-3 (1992) (describing the “dark picture of mistreatment” of
Native American people and their deceased relatives that led to the enactment of
NAGPRA).
143
See WIPO treaty, supra note 32; Intergovernmental Committee on IP, supra
note 32.
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Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Professor James
Anaya counseled against such an approach, recommending instead
that nation-states should recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights to
traditional knowledge and other aspects of their cultural heritage in
alignment with the standards of international human rights law.144
In the text that follows, I will sketch out the existing approach
of international law to traditional cultural expression and compare
the approach that might be generated under the international
human rights law relevant to Indigenous peoples. The choice of
approaches will likely be informed by the contemporary dialogue
on cultural production and international trade, and I will draw on
that dialogue in my discussion, acknowledging that there is no
global consensus on the outer boundaries of this dynamic.
A. Traditional Cultural Expression
The effort to create an equitable set of policies for the
governance of traditional cultural expression has been ongoing for
several decades. In 1989, UNESCO defined “traditional cultural
expression” as:
The totality of tradition-based creations of a cultural
community, expressed by a group or individuals and
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a
community insofar as they reflect its culture and
social identity; its standards and values are
transmitted orally, by imitation or by other means.
Its forms are, among others, language, literature,
music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs,
handicrafts, architecture and other arts.145

144

See Anaya, supra note 48 at 7.
1 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG., Records
of the General Conference, 25th Session 239 (1989), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000846/084696e.pdf#page=242.
145
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In 2005, UNESCO adopted the Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions with the
stated objective of encouraging an intercultural dialogue that
would promote respectful interchange among diverse cultural
groups.146 The 2005 Convention noted the link between culture
and development as a common interest of global nations and called
for an ethic of “partnership” among the nation-states, indicating
that this would best serve their collective interest in promoting
productive international trade. Significantly, this Convention
upholds the sovereignty of the nation-states to implement the
measures that they deem necessary to foster the diversity of
cultural expressions within their territorial boundaries. Nationstates are encouraged to be sensitive to the special needs and
circumstances of particular groups and cultures, while promoting
an overall ethic of productive collaboration around the use of
traditional cultural expression.
In the hands of the communities of origin, traditional cultural
expression is a mechanism to transmit culture across multiple
generations and to ensure the cultural survival of these cultural
communities. Therefore, some commentators argue for a strong
theory of group rights to traditional cultural expression, equivalent
to standard categories of intellectual property rights, but situated in
cultural communities rather than particular individuals.147
However, traditional cultural expression is often contained in the
databases and archives of museums and libraries, and there are no
146

See Rebecca Tsosie, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: An
Argument for Indigenous Governance of Cultural Property, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
(CHRISTOPHER B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT, & JESSICA C. LAI eds., 2012)
233-34 and footnote 37 (discussing 2005 UNESCO Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 2440 UNTS
311 (adopted on 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007).
147
See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 175 (2000).
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uniform policies on governance of these resources.148 Libraries and
museums play an important role in preserving and providing
access to cultural heritage throughout the world, and some
commentators argue against validating cultural rights in the
communities of origin on the theory that libraries, archives, and
museums have a duty to safeguard this knowledge as the “common
heritage of all mankind.”149 Under this view, the purpose of the
institution is to catalogue and distribute information about global
cultures and to build repositories of this knowledge, which is
potentially valuable for many purposes.150
It is clear that the communities of origin have legitimate
concerns about facilitating public access to parts of their culture
and the associated harms that can result from misappropriation and
misuse of their cultures. These harms are even more likely to occur
given technological advances, which enable libraries to collect,
store, preserve, and digitize cultural works, and then transmit those
digital representations broadly through the Internet where they can
be downloaded and even modified without any authorization from
the community of origin. As commentators note, some institutions
are dealing with these issues on a case-by-case basis, developing
institutional protocols and best practices to involve Indigenous
peoples in collaborative management of repositories and archives
of cultural heritage.151 For example, Kimberly Christen described
three principles that were vital to a collaborative endeavor
involving several Indigenous nations from the Plateau region of the
148

Anderson, supra note 102 at 4 (noting that “in most cases, Indigenous people
are not the legal copyright owners of the material,” which means that they
cannot control how the material is used and accessed, and further noting that
much of what they seek to protect “is already in the public domain”).
149
See, e.g., Amy Hackney Blackwell & Christopher William Blackwell,
Hijacking Shared Heritage: Cultural Artifacts and Intellectual Property Rights,
13 CHI. KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 137, 143 (2013) (arguing for open sharing of
data from any object or resource that does not fall under the protection of
intellectual property rights laws).
150
Id.
151
See Anderson and Christen, supra notes 102 and 106 and accompanying text.
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Pacific Northwest.152 The first principle involved developing an
inclusive approach to institutional holdings that comprised Native
perspectives on the resources. The second principle was to respect
and act on both Native American and Western approaches to
“caring for archival collections.”153 The third principle was to
“consult with culturally affiliated community representatives to
identify those materials that are culturally sensitive and develop
procedures for access to and use of those materials.”154
Similarly, experts within the fashion industry are counseling
designers to work with Indigenous artists and communities to
ensure respectful collaboration and avoid exploitive forms of
cultural appropriation.155 This effort also involves a set of best
practices, including involving Native peoples at the outset of
“ideation and design processes,” welcoming their “influence and
control” throughout the production and marketing process, and
offering “financial or resource-based compensation.”156 In
addition, cultural outsiders are encouraged to respect the views of
Indigenous governments, such as the Hopi Tribe, which oppose the
commercial use of Hopi culture by any outside entity based on
their belief that cultural knowledge is sacred and that “only certain
people can have access to certain kinds of information.”157
At this point, these standards and best practices are considered
voluntary and optional in many cases, precisely because the
Indigenous artist or tribal government may not have a recognized
legal right under existing law. The expansion of technology and
global markets offers an additional challenge, as does the
reconfiguration of contemporary cultures due to the transnational
migration of peoples and cultures.
152

Christen, supra note 106 at 195-96.
Id. at 195.
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Id. at 196.
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See Finnerty, supra note 8.at 2F.
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The harms of cultural misappropriation are accentuated in the
contemporary era by politics of “super-diversity,” which Steven
Vertovec describes as a mechanism, which shapes national identity
in the wake of new forms of immigration and transnationalism.158
As applied to cultural production, super-diversity suggests that
“culture” and “cultural difference” (diversity) will be used to
construct, maintain, transform, or undermine national identities
given the diverse forms of human migration and social
organization that characterize the modern world.159 Vertovec
claims that “immigrant cultures are routinely posed as threats to
national culture,” and therefore issues surrounding migration
“stimulate, manifest, and reproduce cultural politics.”160 Within
this matrix, policymakers manipulate “popular notions of national
versus alien culture” by invoking a notion of “difference” premised
upon “particular images, narratives, and symbols of national
culture.”161
As American identity is transformed through the politics of
super-diversity, cultural production will increasingly be used to
sustain a particular national identity. Where will Indigenous
identity fit within this new politics? It is unclear how the politics of
super-diversity will affect cultural production. It is possible that
tribal cultures could be inadvertently associated with foreign
cultures for purposes of exclusionary laws designed to uphold the
dominant culture, such as the recent effort of legislators in
Oklahoma to ban state courts from invoking any “alien” or
“foreign law,” with a specific reference to Sharia law,162 but

158 Steven Vertovec, The Cultural Politics of Nation and Migration, 40 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 241 (2011).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 242.
161
Id. at 242; see also Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66059 (N.D. Okla. May 20, 2015).
162
H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/legislation/52nd/2010/2R/HJ/1056.pdf; see
also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming issuance of a
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clearly implicating tribal law systems as well. It is also possible
that the national governments will further accentuate the
construction of an “American” culture that draws heavily upon its
“Indigenous” past, as a way to encompass Native cultures within
the dominant narrative, in contrast to the “immigrant” cultures of
Asians and Latinos. Significantly, the media has a prominent role
in developing “national narratives” and in the construction of
imagined (national and transnational) communities.163 This is an
additional reason why media images employing Native stereotypes
have such a profound influence on the construction of identity.
I would argue that the project of super-diversity should include
attention to the political movement of Indigenous selfdetermination, which rejects multiculturalism in favor of what
Professor Duane Champagne terms “multinationalism,” that is the
construction of a new consensual political order in which
indigenous peoples are included as sovereign governments and
treated with equal respect.164 Within this matrix, it is imperative
that Indigenous peoples have the ability to control their cultural
identity. The right of self-determination depends upon the ability
of a people to define themselves autonomously as separate cultural
groups with distinctive ties to territory, distinctive forms of social
organization (clans/kinship groups), separate languages, and the
ability to govern themselves under their own laws and institutions.
Indigenous political identity will always depend, to some extent,
upon the group’s ability to use its core cultural identity to
designate itself as separate from the nation-state and other groups.
This means that cultural production must be consistent with
indigenous norms about what is appropriately shared, and what
preliminary injunction of the state constitutional amendment as there was a
likelihood of success that the provision would be unconstitutional).
163
Isabelle Rigoni, Intersectionality and Mediated Cultural Production in a
Globalized Post-Colonial World, 35 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 834, 835
(2012).
164
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must be retained within the group (or even, more narrowly, for
example by certain clans or societies within the group).
This mode of governance may be a challenge for future
generations, given the prevalence of many forms of shared cultural
expression. So, for example, young Native artists have begun to
explore synergies with hip-hop culture and rap music, as well as
skateboard culture.165 Professor David Martinez explores the work
of Doug Miles, an Apache artist and creator of Apache
Skateboards, who observes that skateboarding absorbs all
nationalities and cultures, but also encourages Native artists to
“take back the discourse on their work and redirect the discussion
away from the mythical pristine lens of the past toward how
Indigenous artists actually see themselves.”166 Native identity is
fluid and changing, but also stable and enduring. Native artists and
tribal governments are engaged in cultural production, just as the
dominant society is. However, it is necessary to see what their
respective goals and purposes are, and also understand where the
conflicts are located.
B. The Human Rights Approach to Indigenous Goverance of
Cultural Heritage.
As Professor James Anaya has explained, there are several
composite norms embedded within the concept of Indigenous selfdetermination, including the norm of cultural integrity.167 In my
prior work, I have argued that the human rights approach should be
used to reshape the domestic and international law governing
intangible cultural heritage as it pertains to Indigenous peoples.168
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) offers the most comprehensive treatment of the norm of
165
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cultural integrity in its many provisions, and Article 31 specifically
articulates the right of Indigenous peoples to protect their cultural
heritage:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain,
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage,
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their
sciences, technologies and cultures, including
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicine,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional
games and visual and performing arts. They also
have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their intellectual property over such cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions.
In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States
shall take effective measures to recognize and
protect the exercise of these rights.169
As Article 31 recognizes, most Indigenous peoples do not separate
the tangible and intangible components of their cultural heritage.
Indigenous knowledge gives meaning to cultural symbols and
songs, and that meaning must be articulated and governed by
Indigenous peoples. Any other outcome would perpetuate the
forms of “epistemic injustice” that have characterized the process
of colonization.
In my view, the right of tribal governments to protect their
intangible cultural heritage constitutes the core of their inherent
sovereignty as Indigenous nations. This “cultural” form of
sovereignty cannot be limited by the same artificial construction of
“sovereignty” that informs the characterization of federally169
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recognized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent governments.”
This construction emerged out of the Doctrine of Discovery that
was used to justify European claims to land and sovereignty during
the colonial era. It cannot now serve as the basis to appropriate the
core of Indigenous culture as belonging to the United States or any
other contemporary nation-state which purports to act on behalf of
the Indigenous peoples that were subsumed within its borders.
Rather, as Professor Anaya observes “the same basic arguments
that have resulted in the rejection of the terra nullius doctrine also
speak for a reformation of the public domain, as it applies to
indigenous knowledge.”170 Under this logic, Native people have
always been the custodians of their traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions.
They never ceded their
governance rights and there is no justifiable basis to find that the
nation-state somehow assumed the right to appropriate these
aspects of Indigenous identity.
Thus, the only challenge for contemporary policymakers is to
recognize how existing jurisdictional limitations constrain the
ability of Indigenous governments to protect their intangible
cultural heritage from being misappropriated for commercial gain
or other uses. Tribal governments currently have the power to
enact laws to govern their members and their resources, but they
may be hampered in their ability to apply this law outside
reservation boundaries to non-members of the tribe. This is the
area where federal law could prove useful, if there is an
appropriate set of consultations between the United States and
Indigenous nations, and if there is a way to achieve a political
consensus about the terms of such protection, which will
necessarily require modifications of the domestic law.
At the international level, the nation-states that participate in
WIPO are differentiating the categories of “traditional knowledge,”
“traditional cultural expressions,” and “genetic resources” for
potential action through a multilateral treaty process. The United
170
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States is participating in this effort even though it has not
conducted a formal consultation on this topic with the elected
leaders of the 566 Federally-recognized Indian tribes, which
reprises the dynamic of colonial governance. The political leaders
of the nation-states view Indigenous traditional knowledge and
genetic resources as vital to the appropriate development of natural
resources in an era of climate change.171 For example, the study of
Indigenous seed stocks and farming practices may promote the
development of drought-resistant crops by biotech companies
seeking to patent new products and enable the commercial transfer
of adaptive technologies to countries likely to suffer from warming
trends and drought in the years to come.172 Expanding innovation
in science and technology is the driving force behind the current
effort to reach global consensus on the use of traditional
knowledge and genetic resources.
In comparison, the use of traditional cultural expressions is
often allocated less importance due to the view that this is related
to “art,” rather than “science and technology.” Indigenous
governments should pay close attention to this effort by the nationstates to create new categories and hierarchies that replicate the
same Western cultural assumptions that were used to divest
Indigenous nations of their lands and cultural resources. Will
“traditional cultural expressions” be considered a resource like
property (or intellectual property)? Or are they merely ideas, free
for appropriation by cultural outsiders? The public benefit
argument has always been employed by the colonial nations and
their descendants to justify appropriation from Native peoples.
This argument continues to be made in the contemporary era in the
context of a robust public domain.
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Indigenous peoples must take back the power to define the
terms of the debate within their own cultural frameworks and argue
for a form of governance that respects and protects the core of
Indigenous culture. This process must begin internally, within
each Indigenous group, because only tribal law can adequately
reflect the categories and interests at stake. Professor Angela Riley
and Professor Kristen Carpenter describe the process of using
traditional norms and practices to generate new frameworks of
tribal law in their article “Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights.”173 Building on their
insights, I would argue that tribal law on the protection of
traditional knowledge and cultural expression can be used to
generate a dialogue with the United States and potentially national
legislation that adequately protects the interests of tribal
governments. With participation from Indigenous governments,
the United States would be able to engage in a discussion with
other nation-states about the terms of a multinational convention or
treaty that would protect Indigenous rights. Without such
collaboration, the United States will likely take actions that will
further impair Indigenous rights. Through an intercultural process
of dialogue and collaboration among Indigenous peoples and the
nation-states that encompass them, it may be possible to generate
new categories of law that can overcome the mythology of
discovery and effectively protect the rights of indigenous peoples.
V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental challenge for the future is to develop
equitable governance structures that facilitate respect and
responsibility for the important values and interests at stake. There
are likely various potential models of governance, depending upon
the nature of the community. A “one size fits all” approach to
protecting the rights of an Indigenous community to traditional
cultural expression may not be feasible because these communities
173
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are not equally situated. For many Indigenous peoples, traditional
cultural expression is imbued with sacred value and this must be
acknowledged and respected.174 Within the United States, the
federal government should engage a consultation with tribal
governments to assess the possibility of issuing statutory protection
for tribal “cultural trademarks” as a first step toward protecting
traditional cultural expression. For American Indian, Alaska
Native, and Native Hawaiian peoples within the United States, the
overall issue of governance must be addressed through
international, domestic, and tribal structures of law and policy. The
principles of “humanity and justice” should inform the
contemporary dialogue on cultural production, and tribal
governments should have an equal voice in creating a workable
structure for governance of traditional cultural expression.
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